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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two
remote parties to grow a shared key which they
can use for unconditionally secure communication
over a certain distance. The maximal distance de-
pends on the loss and the excess noise of the con-
necting quantum channel. Several QKD schemes
based on coherent states and continuous variable
(CV) measurements are resilient to high loss in
the channel, but are strongly affected by small
amounts of channel excess noise. Here we propose
and experimentally address a CV-QKD protocol
that uses modulated fragile entangled states of
light to greatly enhance the robustness to channel
noise. We experimentally demonstrate that the
resulting QKD protocol can tolerate more noise
than the benchmark set by the ideal CV coher-
ent state protocol. Our scheme represents a very
promising avenue for extending the distance for
which secure communication is possible.
Introduction
There is a tremendous demand for secure communi-
cation of data in commerce, finance and government af-
fairs. Unconditional security is promised by the use of
a one-time pad strategy where two parties, Alice and
Bob, share a pre-established secret key which they use
for encoding and decoding the message. The confiden-
tiality of the communication therefore falls back on the
generation of a secret key between Alice and Bob [1, 2].
Such a key can be generated with quantum key distri-
bution (QKD) which was first proposed by Bennett and
Brassard in 1984 (BB84) for single photons and discrete
variable measurements [3]. The technology has later been
extended to also include coherent states and continuous
variable (CV) measurements known as CV-QKD [4–13].
A generic CV-QKD protocol between two trusted par-
ties is initiated by Alice, who prepares a distribution of
Gaussian quantum states of light, e.g., coherent [4–11] or
squeezed/entangled states [13–18]. Alice transmits the
states through a quantum channel to Bob, who performs
measurements on the continuous quadrature components
of the light field using either a homodyne detector [4–7]
or a heterodyne detector [8], thus measuring conjugate
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quadratures either randomly or simultaneously, respec-
tively. This results in a set of data that is partially
correlated with Alice’s data set, which she obtained in
the process of preparing the distribution of quantum
states. Alternatively, a two-way quantum communica-
tion scheme can be formulated [12], but we will restrict
our discussion to one-way quantum communication. To
estimate the secrecy of the transmission, Alice and Bob
compare a subset of their data using classical communi-
cation. Provided that the security threshold for channel
loss and excess noise has not been crossed, the resulting
set of raw data can then be mapped onto a shared se-
cret key using classical reconciliation and post-processing
techniques [6, 19, 20].
There are two major hurdles in CV-QKD that limit
the distance for secure communication. The first is the
presence of excess noise, combined with high losses in the
optical channel [4–8], and the second is the limited classi-
cal reconciliation efficiency. For example, in the realistic
CV-QKD scheme based on coherent states, the maximal
secure distance is in theory limited to around 140 km
if the channel excess noise is 4% of vacuum noise, the
loss is 0.2 dB/km and the post-processing efficiency is
96.9% [19]. To enlarge the secure distance, one obvious
strategy is to reduce the channel loss and noise, and to
increase the post-processing efficiency. However, present
CV-QKD systems are already working with state-of-the-
art optical channels and the post-processing efficiency is
also reaching its limit. Therefore, to go beyond the cur-
rently achievable distances, a fundamentally different ap-
proach must be followed.
In this Article we propose and, as a proof-of-principle,
experimentally demonstrate a CV-QKD protocol based
on entangled states of light that is more tolerant to chan-
nel excess noise, channel loss and limited post-processing
efficiency than the coherent state based protocols. Ex-
plicitly, using only 3.5 dB of impure and modulated two-
mode squeezing, we demonstrate the generation of a se-
cret raw key between two parties connected by a noisy
and lossy channel - a channel which cannot be used for
secure communication based on any coherent state proto-
col. A full scale implementation of our proposed protocol
has the capability to significantly boost the robustness
and distance for secure communication using available
technology and a feasible, that is impure, squeezed light
source.
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FIG. 1: Conceptual diagram and purification of our
QKD protocol. a) Alice prepares a conditionally squeezed
state by randomly measuring the amplitude or the phase
quadratures of one mode of an EPR state using a homodyne
detector. The conditionally squeezed state is modulated fur-
ther by a modulator (Mod) fed with a Gaussian white noise
(WN) source controlled by Alice. The homodyne data and
the white noise data are stored for signal processing (SP) and
the gain between them is optimized. The modulated condi-
tionally squeezed state is transmitted through an untrusted
quantum channel where Eve is allowed to perform any at-
tack that mimics the channel transmission η and the channel
excess noise . After the channel Bob performs quadrature
measurements using a homodyne detector and the classical
post-processing can begin. b) Purification scheme for an ar-
bitrary Gaussian QKD protocol. Two quadrature squeezers
(SQZ1 and SQZ2) are placed inside a Mach-Zehnder interfer-
ometer with beam splitters of transmittances T1 and T2 and
fed with modes from two independent EPR sources (EPR1
and EPR2) . The resulting 4-mode state (A,B,C and D) is
pure, while the six free parameters can be set so that the two
modes A and B can simulate any Gaussian two-mode state
(up to a local unitary transformation) including the states
produced in our experimental setup. One mode of the state
is measured by an ideal detector at Alice while the other trav-
els through the channel which has transmission η and excess
noise . Finally Bob’s noisy detection is purified by placing a
beamsplitter with an EPR input and a transmission mimick-
ing his electronic noise, detection efficiency and the noise he
adds to his data, before an ideal detector.
Results
Our protocol. In our scheme we prepare a Gaussian
distribution of squeezed states using the method illus-
trated in Fig. 1 a). Alice prepares a Gaussian entan-
gled state, known as an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR)
state, and measures one of the modes using a homo-
dyne detector that randomly detects the amplitude or
the phase quadrature. This measurement projects the
EPR state onto a Gaussian distribution of conditionally
squeezed states [21]. Such alphabet of squeezed states
could in principle be used to outperform the coherent
state protocol under the condition of pure and strong
entanglement [13]. To release these stringent require-
ments, we propose to enlarge the Gaussian distribution in
phase space by a controlled modulation using two random
and independent Gaussian variables. The final Gaussian
distribution of states is then transmitted through a po-
tentially lossy and noisy quantum channel the action of
which may be ascribed to an eavesdropper (Eve). Finally,
the states are measured by Bob who randomly measures
one of the two conjugate continuous quadratures using
homodyne detection.
After the transmission, Alice holds two sets of data:
one set obtained from the homodyne measurements,
{xHD}, and one from the Gaussian modulation, {xM}.
To maximize the performance of the protocol, we sug-
gest to weight the homodyne data with a gain factor,
g ∈ [0, 1], and subsequently add the two sets to yield the
optimized set: xM + gxHD. The optimal gain factor de-
pends on the strength and the purity of the EPR state. In
the limit of no squeezing, Alice only keeps the data from
the Gaussian modulation and thus the protocol reduces
to the standard coherent state protocol [4, 5]. On the
other hand, for very high antisqueezing, g = 1 and the
values of the resulting data set are equally constructed
from the two subsets. However, in a real life scenario
squeezing is limited and thus an intermediate gain will
optimize the generation of a secret key. The rest of the
classical part of the protocol follows the common recipe
of the generic protocols.
Secret Key. To prove the security of our CV-QKD
protocol, it is sufficient to consider the class of collective
attacks as they have been shown to be optimal under
certain symmetries of the protocol [22–25]. For collective
attacks and using the classical technique of reverse rec-
onciliation [5], the achievable key rate (in the asymptotic
limit of an infinitely long raw key) is given by
I = βIAB − χBE , (1)
where IAB is the Shannon mutual information between
the data of Alice and Bob, χBE is the Holevo bound on
the information available between Bob and Eve and β is
the post-processing efficiency.
To use this general framework for the calculations of
the key rate, it is necessary to define a theoretical prepa-
ration scheme [26–28] where the actual two-mode state
of Alice and Bob is part of a pure multi-mode state [29].
This purification is generated by using pure sources and
accounting for all modes. For example, the standard
prepare-and-measure coherent state or squeezed state
protocols are often treated theoretically by an equiva-
lent entanglement based protocol. In the present work,
the actual setup is already partially entanglement based
however the resulting states are impure due to imper-
fections in the squeezing sources and the imposed mod-
ulations. We therefore define a theoretical preparation
scheme (see Fig. 1 b)) that can generate any two-mode
Gaussian state between Alice and Bob as part of a pure
four-mode state (see Methods).
To reach large distances for which key distribution can
be attained, one must develop a protocol that maximizes
3the key rate in Eq. (1). We start by considering the
standard coherent state protocol assuming unity post-
processing efficiency. It is known that the key rate for
this protocol can be maximized by using an infinitely
large Gaussian modulation and by adding white noise
to Bob’s data, which are obtained by homodyne detec-
tion [13]. Using the above mentioned analysis for col-
lective attacks, we calculate the secure key rate and the
maximally tolerable excess noise, and the results are il-
lustrated by the solid curves in Fig. 2 a) and b) . These
two curves represent the coherent state benchmarks. Em-
ploying the squeezed state protocol suggested in ref. [13],
these benchmarks can be beaten but only for strongly
squeezed states, that is, 5.6 dB noise suppression below
the shot noise limit as illustrated by the dotted curves in
Fig. 2 a) and b).
Now by considering our protocol (Fig. 1 a)), the key
rate and the tolerable excess noise are increased even
further, as shown by the bold dashed lines in Fig. 2.
Comparing the previous squeezed state protocol [13] with
ours, we see that the maximal secure distance attainable
for 3dB squeezed states is increased by a factor of about
19 and the required squeezing for surpassing the coherent
state protocol is lowered from 5.6 dB to 0 dB for pure
two-mode squeezed states. For highly impure two-mode
squeezed states we need 3 dB of two-mode squeezing as
shown by the dot-dashed curve. Our protocol thus has
the remarkable property that any conditionally squeezed
state improves the performance beyond the optimized co-
herent state protocol. Moreover, another important fea-
ture of our protocol is that the squeezed states need not
be pure; arbitrary mixedness can be tolerated as long as
the state is conditionally squeezed. Therefore, the main
resource for increased performance is conditional squeez-
ing. We note however that the performance saturates for
high degrees of squeezing (see. Fig.2 b).
Experimental setup and results. The experimen-
tal setup is sketched in Fig. 3. We start by generat-
ing EPR entanglement between two modes of light [21].
The quadrature of one of the EPR modes is measured by
means of high efficiency homodyne detection at Alice’s
station. In addition to the measurement, we induce a
random but known coherent modulation to the second
EPR mode. After the channel we measure the second
mode using a high efficiency homodyne detector at Bob’s
station, to access either the amplitude quadrature or the
phase quadrature. We use laser light at 1064 nm for
the seeds and local oscillators and 532 nm for the pump
for the optical parametric oscillators (OPOs). The EPR
state has 3.5 dB ±0.2 dB of two-mode squeezing and 8.2
dB ±0.2 dB of antisqueezing and the coherent modula-
tion depth is sequentially varied between 0 and 15 dB. All
measurements are performed at the sideband frequency
of 4.9 MHz with a bandwidth of 90 kHz. The system is
initially calibrated to ensure that the correlation between
conjugate quadratures of Alice is negligible and that the
quadratures of Alice are in phase with Bob.
The experiment was carried out sequentially for con-
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FIG. 2: Theoretical comparison between the perfor-
mance of different CV-QKD protocols. a) Secret key
rate as a function of distance (corresponding to a loss of 0.2 dB
per km) for a fixed excess noise of 0.1 SNU. 1) Ideal coherent
state protocol with 100 SNU modulation. The shaded region
illustrates the regime accessible with coherent state protocols.
2) and 3) Squeezed state protocol with 3 dB and 10 dB squeez-
ing respectively (without additional modulation). 4) and 5)
Our proposed protocol with 3 dB and 10 dB of squeezing
respectively and 100 SNU modulation. The red arrows in-
dicate the improvement of our proposed protocol compared
with the squeezed state protocol with no modulation. For
all protocols, the added noise to Bob’s data is optimized and
β = 1. b) Maximal tolerable channel noise versus the initial
antisqueezed variance. The channel loss is set to 10 dB (cor-
responding to a distance of 50 km). 1) Ideal coherent state
protocol with asymptotically large modulation. The shaded
region illustrates the regime accessible with coherent state
QKD. 2) Squeezed state protocol without additional modu-
lation. 3) New combined squeezed state protocol with 100
SNU of coherent modulation without the gain. This is also
the performance obtained for highly impure squeezed states.
4) Our proposed optimized protocol with 100 SNU coherent
modulation and optimized gain factor. For all protocols, the
added noise to Bob’s data is optimized and β = 1.
jugate quadratures; the amplitude quadrature was first
conditionally squeezed, displaced and measured, and the
procedure was then repeated for the phase quadrature.
We add the homodyne and modulation data with an opti-
mized gain. For technical reasons, we multiply the mod-
ulation data with the inverse of the gain factor. This
results in two large data strings, one for Alice and one
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FIG. 3: Experimental setup. A squeezed state is gener-
ated in each of the two optical parametric oscillators (OPOs),
operated below threshold. The squeezed states interfere at a
beam splitter to form a two-mode squeezed state. The ampli-
tude or the phase quadrature of the one mode is measured by
Alice’s homodyne detector. The other mode is carefully phase
locked to a coherently modulated auxiliary mode. The aux-
iliary state is generated using a phase modulator (PM) and
an amplitude modulator (AM), each of which are driven by a
white noise generator. Alice acquires information about the
modulation by measuring a part of the auxiliary state. The
coherent state is purified by the highly asymmetric beamsplit-
ter all of this in order to minimize the harmful preparation
noise [28]. The modulated and conditionally squeezed state
is transmitted through the channel to Bob’s homodyne detec-
tor where one of the conjugate quadratures is measured. The
resulting measurement outcomes are fed via a fast AD card
to a computer for signal processing.
for Bob, which are strongly correlated as shown for three
different modulation depths in Fig. 4 a)-c ). The cor-
relations arise partly from the quadrature entanglement
and partly from the coherent modulation. From the cor-
related data we compute the covariance matrices as illus-
trated in Fig. 4 d)-f), from which we can estimate the
security limits for our system (see Methods).
Discussion
In the laboratory the channel transmission is 95% and
the excess noise can be continuously varied by unbalanc-
ing the generated data at Alice and Bob. As an example
we set the excess noise to 0.45 shot noise units (SNU)
and the total modulation depth to 23.4 SNU. For these
settings of the experiment we generate a raw key with
a rate of 0.004 ± 0.001 bit per state. We note that nei-
ther the coherent state based protocols nor the standard
squeezed state based protocol (with 3.5 dB squeezing)
could have generated a key in such a channel.
We now investigate the security performance of our
protocol in longer channels based on the experimentally
measured covariance matrices assuming perfect post-
processing and channel estimation. The matrices are
used in a model that includes the trusted losses and noise
sources of the detectors, and in which arbitrary channel
loss and excess noise can be simulated. As an example we
assume a channel transmission of 10% and find the tolera-
ble excess noise for six different realizations of the covari-
ance matrices illustrated in Fig. 4 g). Finally, in Fig. 4
h) we plot the maximum distance and loss as a function
of the tolerable noise associated with the experimentally
realized covariance matrix in Fig. 4 f). We clearly see
that by combining squeezed states with coherent mod-
ulation we beat the performance of any coherent state
protocol (limited to the shaded region). The supremacy
of the squeezed state protocol relative to the coherent
state protocol is best seen by equalizing the amount of
energy used in the two protocols. In this case, the states
entering the channel are identical and Eve cannot tell
the difference between the two protocols. The relative
improvement is illustrated by the dot-dashed curve rela-
tive to the dashed curve in Fig. 4 g).
In the analysis above we have assumed perfect classi-
cal post-processing (corresponding to β = 1). However,
the key rate of real world implementations of CV-QKD
is currently limited by the inefficiency of the yet devel-
oped classical error codes [19, 30]. We have therefore
considered the effect of imperfect post-processing on our
protocol corresponding to a security analysis with β < 1.
The results of this analysis for an optimistic β = 0.98 are
illustrated in the insets of Fig. 4 g) and Fig. 4 h), while
a more pessimistic β = 0.95 can be seen in supplemen-
tary Figure S1, and further discussed in the supplemen-
tary discussion. Finally we fix the channel transmission
to 10% and plot the tolerable excess noise as a function
of the post-processing efficiency in supplementary Figure
S2. It is evident from the figures that despite inefficient
post-processing, our squeezed state protocol remains su-
perior to the coherent state protocol, and remarkably, it
is seen that the relative improvement has increased. We
also note that the optimal performance occurs for a finite
modulation depth. If the beta factor becomes very low, a
different squeezed state protocol must be considered [31].
As mentioned above, the performance of our proto-
col is partially parametrized by the degree of conditional
squeezing. In our realization, the conditionally squeezed
states were prepared by measuring one mode of a two-
mode squeezed state. However, alternatively, the condi-
tionally squeezed state could have been prepared directly
by modulating a single-mode squeezed states beyond the
antisqueezing. The direct benefit of such a strategy is
that the degree of conditional squeezing is identical to
the degree of the single mode squeezed state. Protocols
with single mode squeezed states will be studied in future
work.
We have introduced and experimentally addressed a
QKD protocol based on continuous variable squeezed
states of light. Interestingly, we find that the key rate as
well as the robustness against channel noise is improved
for any degree of conditional squeezing compared to the
idealized and optimized coherent state protocol. The re-
5quirement on the purity of the squeezed states is relaxed,
thus rendering the protocol provably secure against any
type of attack on the channel. In fact, by using strongly
squeezed but also highly impure states, such as those pro-
duced via the large bandwidth Kerr effect in standard
optical fibers (where up to 6.8 dB of squeezing and 29.6
dB of anti-squeezing has been produced [32]), the coher-
ent modulation is left unnecessary. In future commercial
implementations, miniaturized waveguide cavities could
be used to make on chip squeezed state QKD.
Methods
A. Theory of the protocol
After obtaining the two-mode covariance matrix, the
security analysis of our protocol follows the well estab-
lished security proofs for the Gaussian CV-QKD pro-
tocols, which are based on the extremality of Gaussian
states [22] and consequently the optimality of Gaussian
collective attacks [23, 24]. From this, it follows that the
lower bound on the key rate as stated in eq. (1), can be
obtained from the covariance matrix of the state. Given
that the difference in (1) is positive, the classical privacy
amplification algorithms can distill a secure key.
The Shannon mutual information is calculated directly
from the variance of Alice’s quadrature data, VA, and Al-
ice’s variance conditioned on Bob’s measurement, VA|B ,
as IAB =
1
2 log2(VA/VA|B). The gain factor, weighting
the fraction of Alice’s homodyne measurement results, is
then optimized to maximize the mutual information.
The Holevo quantity is expressed through the von Neu-
mann entropies S(·) as χBE = S(ρE) − S(ρxBE ) in the
reverse reconciliation scheme, where ρE is the density
matrix of Eve’s states and ρxBE is the density matrix con-
ditioned by Bob’s measurement. If untrusted noise is
present in the system, Eve is assumed to be able to pu-
rify the system of Alice and Bob so that S(ρE) = S(ρ˜AB)
and S(ρxBE ) = S(ρ˜
xB
AB) (assuming, with no loss of gener-
ality, that the amplitude quadrature is measured by Bob
with result xB), where ρ˜AB is the pure state shared be-
tween Alice and Bob [6]. Thus, in order to calculate the
Holevo quantity we need to purify the state of Alice and
Bob. In the theoretical analysis of the protocol, it is done
by explicitly introducing all trusted modes [13, 28] and
constructing the overall covariance matrix of the trusted
pure state. The von Neumann entropies are then calcu-
lated from the symplectic eigenvalues of the respective
covariance matrices (See supplementary methods for de-
tails).
B. Experimental data security analysis
The measurement and the subsequent data processing
(including gain optimization) resulted in a set of covari-
ance matrices for different values of modulation. The se-
curity analysis was carried out according to the above de-
scribed purification method and cross-checked using the
entangling cloner method (which is shown to be optimal
for the individual attacks in [26] and used for the col-
lective attacks in [7]). Since the explicit trusted mode
structure of the experimentally obtained states was not
known, the experimental covariance matrices were puri-
fied using the Bloch-Messiah reduction theorem [29] as
illustrated in Fig. 1 b). For each of the covariance ma-
trices the 4-mode pure state (ABCD on Fig. 1 b)) was
constructed and used to calculate the Holevo quantity
and the resulting lower bound on secure key rate.
In parallel, the theoretical estimation of the expected
protocol performance was calculated from the experi-
mental parameters of our setup. The covariance matri-
ces were constructed from the experimentally measured
EPR states. All the respective transmittances and ef-
ficiencies were applied in both EPR modes (as beam-
splitter transformations) and the coherent modulation
was added atop. The resulting covariance matrices were
tested against given channel transmittance and excess
noise.
Furthermore we have simulated the accuracy in esti-
mating the channel as a function of the size of the data
blocks. The results are shown in the Supplementary Fig-
ure S3) and discussed in the Supplementary discussion.
C. Experimental setup details
Our light source is an Innolight Diabolo laser produc-
ing light at 1064 nm and 532 nm. Both beams are sent
through high finesse triangular mode cleaning cavities for
temporal and spatial mode cleaning. The mode at 532
nm is used as the pump for the optical parametric os-
cillators (OPOs) whereas the mode at 1064 nm serves
as a lock beam for the OPOs, auxiliary beam for the
modulation channel and as local oscillators (LOs) for
the homodyne detection systems. The OPOs are 25 cm
long bowtie shaped cavities with two curved dichromatic
mirrors (with 25 mm radius of curvature and highly re-
flective at 1064 nm) and two plane mirrors; one with a
highly reflective coating and another one with a reflec-
tivity of 8% for OPO1 and 10% for OPO2. This yields
cavity bandwidths of around 21 MHz and 24 MHz. The
nonlinear crystals inside the OPOs are temperature con-
trolled type I periodically poled KTP crystals which are
phase matched for down conversion at the specified wave-
lenghts. Each of the crystals is pumped with 170 mW of
the 532 nm beam, which means that the OPOs are oper-
ating well below threshold. A small part of the squeezed
output beam is tapped of and used for locking the phase
of the pump to deamplification thereby generating ampli-
tude squeezed sidebands. The states measured directly
have 4.9 dB and 4.1 dB of shot noise reduction along
the squeezed quadratures and 8.3 dB of increased noise
along the conjugate quadratures. When coupling these
two squeezed seeds we measure an EPR state with 3.5 dB
6two-mode squeezing and 8.2 dB of antisqueezing. The to-
tal homodyne detection efficiency is 90% ± 5% at Alice
and 85%±5% at Bob. The signal is mixed down and low
passed with a 90 kHz filter before it is digitalized with
a sampling rate of 500 kHz. Each data block consists of
around 200.000 points.
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8FIG. 4: QKD measurement results. a-c) The red points
represent the normalized and weighted quadrature data of Al-
ice and Bob for three different depths of coherent modulation.
In the left and the right the amplitude and phase quadrature
correlations are shown, respectively. The extra modulation
added is 0 SNU in a), 3.6 SNU in b) and 23.8 SNU in c),
which comes on top of 3.6 SNU modulation from the EPR
source. These correlated data are contrasted with a set of un-
correlated data points (green) with identical total energy. The
solid black ellipse and outer circle correspond to two standard
deviations of these two respectively. The inner blue circle is
two standard deviations of shot noise. d-f) Illustrations of the
covariance matrices for the three modulation depths. g) Tol-
erable excess noise as a function of the modulation depth for
a simulated transmission of η = 0.1. The uncertainty repre-
sents the actual measurements with compensation for 85±5%
quantum detection efficiency as the dominating source of un-
certainty. The theoretical estimates for the ideal coherent
state protocol and our protocol with the experimental param-
eters are given by the solid and dashed curves, respectively.
For comparison, we also include the performance of the co-
herent state protocol with an energy identical to the energy
of the two-mode squeezing protocol (dot dashed curve). The
shaded region illustrates the regime accessible with coherent
state QKD. The inset is the same as the main figure but with
limited post-processing efficiency β = 98%. h) The maximally
tolerable loss as a function of the channel excess noise. The
thick dashed line is for the data set presented in c) and f),
the solid curve is for the ideal coherent state protocol. The
dotted curve corresponds to the two-mode squeezing proto-
col without additional modulation presented in matrix a) and
d). The shaded region illustrates the regime accessible with
coherent state QKD. The distance scale assumes 0.2 dB loss
per km. The insert is the same as the main figure, the dot-
ted curve being the data set presented in a) and d) but with
limited post-processing efficiency β = 98%.
